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Abstract We study the consequence of moving from Customer Lifetime Value
maximization to Customer Equity maximization. Customer equity has tradition-
ally been seen as the discounted sum of the lifetime earnings from all current and
future customers and thus it has been largely assumed that maximizing customer
lifetime value would lead to maximum customer equity. We show that the
transition from CLV to CE is not that straightforward. Although the CLV model is
appropriate for managing a single non-replaceable customer, the application of a
CLV model to the acquisition and valuation of customers as an ongoing concern
for the firm leads to sub-optimal customer relationship management and
acquisition strategies. This leads the firm following a CLV maximization approach
to have a smaller and less profitable customer base than one that follows a CE
maximization strategy.
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1 Introduction
In an era when Customer Relationship Management (CRM) is widely espoused,
many researchers extol the virtues of Customer lifetime value (CLV) as the best
metric to use to select customers and optimize marketing actions (Farris et al 2006;
Fader et al. 2005; Reinartz and Kumar 2003). A customer’s lifetime value is the net
present value of all profits derived from that customer. It is constructed using core
metrics such as customer retention rate, revenue per customer, and discount rate of
money. Berger and Nasr (1998) discuss the concept in detail and provide many
different ways to compute it depending on the situation the firm is facing.
Proponents of CLV argue that it should be used for customer acquisition (CLV is
the upper bound of what one should be willing to spend acquiring a customer lest
one wants to lose money−Farris et al. 2006; Berger and Nasr 1998), customer
selection (one should focus on customer with high CLV−Venkatesan and Kumar
2004), and resource allocation (marketing resources should be allocated so as to
maximize CLV−Reinartz et al. 2005; Venkatesan and Kumar 2004).
Along with this renewed interest in CLV, there has been a move towards using
Customer Equity (CE) as a marketing metric both for assessing the return of
marketing actions and to value firms as a whole. The metric, proposed by Blattberg
and Deighton (1996) and defined by Rust et al. (2004) as “the total of the discounted
lifetime values summed over all the firm’s current and potential customers,” seeks to
assess the value of not only a firm’s current customer base, but also its potential or
future customer base as well. This long term view seems appropriate since a firm’s
actions at any given time do not only affect its customer base at that point in time,
but they also affect its ability to recruit and retain customers in subsequent time
periods. Customer Equity has been endorsed by many researchers. For instance,
Berger et al. (2002) make CE the foundation on which they build their framework
for managing customers as assets; Bayon et al. (2002) make a case that CE is the
best basis for customer analysis; Gupta et al. (2004) use CE as a basis for valuing
firms. Villanueva et al. (2008) use CE to measure the impact of different acquisition
methods on the long term value of the firm.
There is a direct link between CLV and CE: customer equity is the sum of the CLV
of all current and future customers. When building CE as an aggregation of CLVs,
researchers have taken for granted that the precepts coming out of a CLV analysis
still apply when looking at customer equity (e.g., CLV is a limit to acquisition
spending; maximizing CLV is equivalent to maximizing CE). The distinction
between CLV and CE is confounded by the fact that some researchers (e.g., Berger
and Bechwatti 2002) use the terms interchangeably. There is no doubt however that
the two concepts are distinct; CLV computes the value of a customer to the firm
while CE measures the value of all present and future customers given a firm’s
marketing actions (e.g., acquisition policy, marketing mix). There is no doubt that
when valuing a firm (Gupta et al. 2004) one should use CE as a metric rather than
CLV. But, when optimizing marketing decisions, are CLV and CE interchangeable?
Since CE is a sum of CLV, are we maximizing CE when we maximize CLV? The
theoretical development we conduct in this paper shows that the answer to these two
questions is a resounding No. Maximizing CLV is sub-optimal from a CE
perspective, it leads to the wrong marketing actions and the wrong acquisition
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policy. We find that firms that optimize CLV generate lower profits and retain fewer
customers than firms that optimize CE.To show why CLV is sub-optimal, we start
with a discussion of customers as a resource to the firm (Section 2.1) and show that a
firm should aim to maximize the long-term value of this resource. Based on this
discussion, we derive a general functional form for a firm’s Customer Equity in
Section 2.3. In Sections 3.1 and 4, we derive the first order condition that must be
satisfied to maximize CE and perform comparative statics to show how marketing
actions should be adapted when control variables (e.g., retention rate, acquisition
effectiveness) change. We show how maximizing CE is different from maximizing
CLV such that maximizing CLV is sub-optimal from a customer equity standpoint.
Then, in Section 5, we discuss the impact of a long term focus on acquisition
spending. We show that firms that aim to maximize CE will spend less on
acquisition than a firm that aims to maximize CLV; however, it will retain its
customers longer and generate larger total profits. In Section 6, we show our model
to be robust to both observed and un-observed heterogeneity. We conclude the paper
in Section 7.
2 A customer equity model
For modeling purposes, and in the spirit of Berger et al. (2002), we consider the case
of a firm that is trying to generate revenues by contacting members of its database.
Customers are recruited through an acquisition policy and are contacted at fixed
intervals. The problem for the firm is to set its marketing policy, defined here as the
contact periodicity and the amount of money spent on acquisition, that will
maximize its expected revenues, taking into account the various costs it faces
(acquisition, communication) and the reaction of customers to the firm’s policy
(defection, purchase).
When developing our model of customer equity, we pay particular attention to
two processes. First, we seek to capture the customer acquisition/retention process in
a meaningful way. Second, we seek to capture the impact of the firm’s marketing
actions on customer retention and expenditure.
2.1 Customer flow: acquisition and retention process
Fundamentally, managing a database of customer names is a dynamic problem that
hinges on balancing the cultivation of surplus from the firm’s customers with
the retention of customers for future rent extraction. The problem of extracting the
highest possible profits from a database of customer names is similar to the
challenges encountered by researchers studying the management of natural
resources. Economists (Sweeny 1992) consider three types of resources: depletable,
renewable, and expendable. The distinction is made based on the time scale of the
replenishment process. Depletable resources, such as crude oil reserves, are those for
which the replenishment process is so slow that one can model them as being
available once and only once and with the recognition that spent resources cannot be
replaced. Renewable resources, such as the stock of fish in a lake or pond, adjust
more rapidly so that they renew within the time horizon studied. However, any
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action in a given time period that alters the stock of the resource will have an impact
on the stock available in subsequent periods. Finally, expendable resources, such as
solar energy, renew themselves at such a speed that their use in one period has little
or no impact on subsequent periods.
Depending on the type of resource a firm is managing, it faces different
objectives. In the case of a depletable resource, the firm is interested in the optimal
use of the resource in its path to depletion. With a renewable resource, the firm is
interested in long-term equilibrium strategies. Faced with an expendable resource,
the firm is interested in its best short-term allocation.
When looking at its customer database, a firm can treat its customers as any of
these three resource types depending on the lens it uses for the problem. In the
cohort view (the basis for CLV), customers are seen as a depletable resource. New
cohorts of customers are recruited over time, but each cohort will eventually become
extinct (Wang and Spiegel 1994). Attrition is measured by the difference in cohort
size from 1 year to another. In an email-SPAM environment, where consumers
cannot prevent the firm from sending them emails, and where new email names can
readily be found by “scouring” the Internet, the firm views consumers as an
expendable resource and thus can take a short-term approach to profit maximization.
Customer equity takes a long term approach to valuing and optimizing a firm’s
customer base. For a firm with a long-term horizon, a depletable resource view of
customers is not viable as it implies that the firm will lose all its customers at some
point. Thus a customer acquisition process must be in place for the firm to survive.
Further, if the firm observes defection and incurs acquisition costs to replace lost
customers, then it cannot treat its customers as expendable. Hence, we argue that the
appropriate way to look at the profit maximization problem is to view customers as a
renewable resource. This view is the basis for our formulation and analysis of a
firm’s customer equity. Further, if the firm views customers as a renewable resource,
then it must evaluate its policies in terms of the long-term equilibrium they generate.
This is the approach we take in this paper.
2.2 The impact of marketing actions on customer retention and expenditure
One cannot capture in a simple model the impact of all possible marketing actions
(pricing decisions, package design, advertising content…). Hence, as in Venkatesan
and Kumar (2004), we concentrate on optimizing the frequency with which a firm
should contact its customer base. It is a broadly applicable problem that is
meaningful for many applications, not only for the timing of mail or email
communications, but also the frequency of calls by direct sales force or the intensity
of broadcast advertising. It also possesses some interesting characteristics that
illustrate typical tensions among marketing levers in terms of spending on retention
versus cultivation efforts. For instance, the effect of the periodicity of communica-
tion on attrition is not so straightforward. To see why, one can conduct the following
thought experiment: let us consider the two extremes in contact periodicity. At one
extreme, a firm might contact its clients so often that the relationship becomes too
onerous for the clients to maintain and thus they sever their links to the company,
rendering their names worthless. (Evidence of this phenomenon can be seen in the
emergence of the ‘Do Not Call Registry’ in 2003 as well as the Anti-Spamming Act
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of 2001.) At the other extreme, the firm never contacts its customers and, although
the names have a potential value, this value is never realized. Thus, periodicity
affects the value of names in two ways. On the one hand, more frequent contact
leads to more opportunities to earn money. On the other hand, more frequent contact
provides customers with more opportunities to defect. The latter can quickly lead to
high long-term attrition. Imagine the case of a company that has a retention rate of
97% from one campaign to another. This might at first glance seem like outstanding
loyalty. However, if the firm were to contact its database every week then it would
lose 80% of its current customers within a year! Clearly, there must be an
intermediate situation where one maximizes the realized value from a name by
optimally trading off the extraction of value in the short-term against the loss of
future value due to customer defection.
2.3 Customer equity
Our customer equity model is in essence a version of the model developed by Gupta
et al. (2004) that has been modified to directly take into account the requirement
described in the preceding two sections. In particular, we make customer retention
and customer spending a function of the time elapsed between communication (t).
We also explicitly develop a consumer production function (Si(t)) that characterizes
how the customer base evolves from one period to another as a function of
acquisition and retention.
Because the time elapsed between each communication is a control variable, we
must be careful when discounting revenues and expenses. To apply the correct
discount rate to expenses and revenues, one must pinpoint when each occurs.
Consistent with Venkatesan and Kumar (2004), we assume that acquisition expenses
are an ongoing expenditure that the firm recognizes on a periodic basis (e.g.,
monthly) while communications expenses and revenues are recognized at the time of
the communication. This assumption is consistent with our observations of practice,
where the acquisition costs are decoupled from the marketing activities once the
names are acquired. This is also a recommendation of Blattberg and Deighton
(1996), highlighting the different roles of acquisition and retention efforts.
Based on these assumptions, Customer Equity can be generally defined as:
CE tð Þ ¼
X1
i¼0





i is an index of communications
j is an index of time periods
e-r is the per period discount rate1
t is the periodicity of contact
1 NPV calculations traditionally uses 1/(1 + d), where d is the discount rate of money, as the discount
factor. To make our derivations simpler, we use e—r instead. The two formulations are equivalent if we set
r=ln(1 + d).
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Ri (t) is the expected profit (revenues net of cost of goods sold and variable
communication costs) per customer for communication i
Si (t) is the number of people in the database when communication i was sent
FCi is the fixed cost associated with communication i
AQj is the acquisition costs incurred in time period j.
Further, we define the customer profit (Ri (t)) and production (Si (t)) functions as:
Ri tð Þ ¼ Ai tð Þ  VCið Þ; ð2Þ
Si tð Þ ¼ Si1 tð ÞPi tð Þ þ gi tð Þ: ð3Þ
Where:
Ai(t) is the expected per-customer gross profit for communication i
VCi is the variable cost of sending communication i
S0(t) = 0
Pi(t) is the retention rate for communication i
gi(t) is the number of names acquired between campaigns i-1 and i.
The model laid out above is a general case that is applicable to many situations.
However, we make the following simplifications in order to make the maximization
problem more tractable. First, we assume that the acquisition efforts are constant
over time and produce a steady stream of names (i.e., gi tð Þ ¼ t:g;AQj ¼ AQ gð Þ).
There is no free production of names and the cost of acquisition increases with the
size of the name stream such that: AQð0Þ ¼ 0; @AQðgÞ=@g > 0. Second, we assume
that the fixed and variable communications costs are constant across communica-
tions (i.e., VCi ¼ VC;FCi ¼ FC). Third, we assume that the communications are
identical in nature, if not in actual content, and that customers’ reaction to the
communications depends only on their frequency such that: Ai tð Þ ¼ A tð Þ and
Pi tð Þ ¼ P tð Þ. Further, we assume that A(t) is monotonically increasing in t, with A
(0)=0 and A(∞) finite (i.e., the more time the firm has to come up with a new offer,
the more attractive it can make it—up to a point), and that P(t) is inverted-U shaped
(i.e., retention is lowest when the firm sends incessant messages or when it never
contacts its customers and there is a unique optimal communication periodicity for
retention purposes) and dependent on A(t) such that @P tð Þ=@A tð Þ > 0 (i.e., the
better the offer, the higher the retention rate).
We assume, for now, that customers are treated by the firm as homogenous
entities; i.e., there is no observed heterogeneity the firm can use to derive different t
for different individual. This is consistent with the recommendation of a number of
CLV researchers (Zeithaml et al. 2001; Berger et al. 2002; Libai et al. 2002; Hwang
et al. 2004) who talk about generating a set of rules for groups (or segments) of
customers. It is also an approach that is widely followed by practitioners, customers
are often segmented into fairly homogenous subgroups and then each subgroup is
treated independently. With this in mind, we would argue that each customer
segment has its own CE with its own acquisition and retention process; Eq. (1) can
then be applied to each of these segments. We will return to the issue of
heterogeneity in Section 6.
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We defer to the technical appendix for a more complete justification of our
assumptions. We also discuss the robustness of the major findings to the relaxation
of these assumptions later in this paper when appropriate. Building on these
assumptions, we can rewrite the customer equity equations as follows:
CE tð Þ ¼
X1
i¼0




Si tð Þ ¼ Si1 tð ÞP tð Þ þ t:g ð5Þ
R tð Þ ¼ A tð Þ  VCð Þ: ð6Þ
Weshow (Lemma 1) that, given (5), in the long run, the database reaches an equilibrium
size, regardless of the number of names the firm is endowed with at time 0 (S0).
Lemma 1 For any given constant marketing actions there exists a steady state such
that the database is constant in size. The steady state size is S ¼ t:g1P tð Þ :
Proof See Appendix A.1.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward given the database production
function (5). For any given t the firm acquires a constant number of new names (t.g)
between every communication, but it loses names in proportion (P(t)) to its database
size. Consequently, the database will be at equilibrium when the firm, between one
communication and the next, acquires as many names as it loses due to the
communication.
This is analogous to Little’s Law, which states that an inventory reaches a steady
state size, L, which is a product of the arrival rate of new stock (l) and the expected
time spent by any single unit of stock in the inventory (W) or L=lW (Little 1961).
When Little’s Law is applied to an inventory of customer names we have L ¼ S the
expected number of units in the system, l—t.g the arrival rate of new units, and
W ¼ 1= 1 P tð Þð Þ the expected time spent by a unit in the system. Little’s Law
yields a finite inventory size, as long as l and W are both finite and stationary. This
law has been the subject of numerous papers and has been shown to hold under very
general assumptions. This means that Lemma 1 will hold (in expected value) for any
stochastic acquisition and retention process as long as they are stationary in the long
run, that t and g are finite, and P tð Þ < 1. The appeal of Little’s Law applied to the
CE problem is its robustness. This relationship holds even if:
& there is seasonality in retention or acquisition (aggregated to the year level, these
processes become stationary—e.g., g = E[Yearly acquisition rate]),
& the firm improves its ability to attract new customers (as long as g ¼ lim
t!1 gðtÞ is
finite, where t is the length of time the firm has been in business),
& there is heterogeneity in customer retention (see Section 6),
& customer retention increases—possibly due to habit formation or inertia—as
customers stay in the database longer (provided that lim
t!1P t; tð Þ < 1; where t is
the length of time during which a customer has been active).
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Lemma 1 yields some interesting properties for the CE model. First, it allows
managers to ex ante predict the long-term database size and CE. All they need to know
is their long-term attrition rate and acquisition effectiveness. This is particularly
important when valuating young companies (e.g., start-ups) as it provides a monitoring
tool and a base for predicting long-term value. Second, it allows us to further simplify
the formulation of CE. Indeed, we can write the steady state CE:
CE tð Þ ¼
X1
i¼0
eirt R tð ÞS tð Þ  FC X1
j¼0
ejrAQðgÞ;
or, taking the limit of sums:
CE tð Þ ¼ R tð ÞS tð Þ  FC  ert
ert  1  AQðgÞ
er
er  1 : ð7Þ
Third, the elements of (7) are quite easy to compute for database marketers.
Having a database of names they track, they can measure S (it is the number of live
names in the database), they can compute R as the average per-customer profit per
campaign, the various costs can be obtained from their accounting department (as is
r). Finally, they can set t to maximize CE(t) as discussed in Proposition 2, below.
Fourth, the optimal marketing actions and the resulting steady state database size
is a function of the rate of the acquisition stream, not its cost. We formalize this
point in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 Given an acquisition stream, the marketing actions that maximize CE
depend on the rate of acquisition, but are separable from the cost of acquisition.
Proof The proof is straightforward. One only needs to recognize that CE can be split in
two terms. The first one depends on g and τ, the second one depends on g only. That is:

















f t; gð Þ ¼ 0:
The essence of the proof stems from the observation that the acquisition
expenditures precede and are separable from the frequency of contact or the message
content. Once names have entered the database, it is the marketer’s responsibility to
maximize the expected profits extracted from those names, treating the cost of
acquisition as a sunk cost. That is, when optimizing the contact strategy, the firm
only needs to know how many new names are acquired every month, not how much
these names cost. Everything else being constant, two firms having the same
acquisition rate, but different acquisition costs will have identical inter-
communication intervals (but different overall profitability).
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Lemma 2 belies the belief that one should be more careful with names that
were expensive to acquire than with names that were acquired at low cost.
This does not imply, however, that acquisition costs are irrelevant. The long-
term profitability of the firm relies on the revenues generated from the
database being larger than the acquisition costs. Further, acquisition costs are
likely to be positively correlated with the quality of the names acquired (where
better quality is defined by either higher retention or higher revenue per
customer). Nevertheless, the optimal marketing activity are a function of the
acquisition rate (g) and can be set without knowledge of the cost associated with
this acquisition rate (AQ(g)).
The importance of Lemma 2 is that it allows us to split customer equity in
two parts: the value of the customer database and the cost of replenishing the
database to compensate attrition. We can thus study the optimization problem
in two stages. First, solve (Section 3.1) the problem of maximizing the database
value given a predetermined acquisition stream (i.e., find t"*
g). Second, optimize
(Section 5.1) the acquisition spending given the characterization of t*. Further,
this Lemma formalizes Blattberg and Deighton’s (1996) suggestion that, when
maximizing customer equity, the “acquisition” and the “customer equity”
management tasks are very different, and should be treated separately.
3 Customer equity and customer lifetime value
We now turn to the profit maximization problem given an acquisition stream of
names (g). As we have shown in the previous section, if the acquisition expenditures
are independent of t, we can ignore them when optimizing the communication
strategy. The problem to the firm then becomes:
max
t>0
Vce tð Þ ¼ R tð ÞS tð Þ  FC
  ert
ert  1 : ð8Þ
In this equation V (the database value part of CE) represents the net present value
of all future expected profits and the subscript ce indicates that we take a customer
equity approach, as opposed to the customer lifetime value approach that we will
formulate shortly (using clv as a subscript). We show in Proposition 1 that
maximizing the CLV leads to different solutions than maximizing Vce such that
maximizing the CLV is sub-optimal with regard to long-term customer equity
maximization.
Proposition 1 CLV maximization is sub-optimal with regard to the long-term
profitability of the firm.
Proof See Appendix A.2.
The intuition behind the proof is that when computing aCLVone accounts for the fact
that, due to attrition, customers have a decreasing probability of being active as time
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eirtP tð Þi R tð Þ  FC
S
 




ert  P tð Þ : ð9Þ
Thus, we can restate the database value (8) in terms of the customer lifetime value
as:
Vce tð Þ ¼ CLV tð ÞS e
rt  P tð Þ
ert  1 : ð10Þ
In this equation, the multiplier e
rtP tð Þ
ert1 > 1 accounts for the fact that customers are
renewable and lost customers are replaced. The lower the retention rate, the higher
the multiplier. Further, the multiplier increases as the discount rate (r) or the
communication interval (t) decreases
Following Eq. (10), the database value is equal to the CLV multiplied by a
correction factor. Maximizing the CLV will thus lead to the maximum customer
equity if and only if, at the maximum CLV, the derivative of the multiplier with
respect to t is equal to 0. We show in Appendix A.2 that this can only occur if t*=0.
But, as we will show in the next section, t* is always strictly greater than zero. Thus,
the marketing actions that maximize the CLV do not also maximize the long term CE
of the firm. Therefore, CLV maximization is sub-optimal for the firm!
One should note that when computing the CLV (9) we allocated a portion of the
campaign costs (FC) to each name. This allocation does not affect the substance of
our findings. Indeed, if we were to ignore the fixed costs at the name level, we
would compute the CLV as:
CLV tð Þ ¼ R tð Þ e
rt
ert  P tð Þ : ð11Þ
Thus, we would have:
Vce ¼ ½CLV tð ÞS tð Þ e
rt  P tð Þ
ert  1  FC
ert
ert  1 :
The value of the database as a whole is the value of its names minus the costs
associated with extracting profits from these names. In valuating each name we find
the same multiplier e
rtP tð Þ
ert1 as we had when we incorporated the costs directly in the
name value.
3.1 Finding the optimal periodicity (t*)
In order to optimize the firm’s marketing actions for any given acquisition strategy,
we calculate the first-order condition for optimality by differentiating (8) with
respect to t. Without further specifying the general functions that constitute the
database value, it is not possible to generate an explicit closed-form solution for
optimal t. However, we can make some inferences using comparative static tools.
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We start by describing the first-order condition, expressed as a function of the
elasticities of the retention and profit functions with respect to changes in the inter-
communication interval. Then, we study how the first-order condition changes as a
result of changes in retention, profit, acquisition, and discount.
Proposition 2 The first-order condition for a firm that seeks to maximize its
database value by optimizing the inter-communication interval is















P tð Þ is the elasticity of S with respect to t;
hD ¼
rt




with; respect to t;
GM ¼ R tð Þ:S tð Þ  FC
R tð Þ:S tð Þ is the gross margin yielded by each communication:
Proof See Appendix B.1.
The proof of Proposition 2 is an algebraic exercise that leads to a simple
expression of the first-order condition: a linear combination of elasticities. The
optimal inter-communication interval (t*) is found when the sum of elasticities is
equal to 0. When the sum is positive, the firm would increase its value by
increasing t. When the sum is negative, the firm would be better off decreasing its
t. As we show in the Technical Appendix, if there exists a t such that Vce (t) is
positive, then there exists a unique t* that is finite and strictly positive. This is not
a restrictive condition, as it only assumes that it is possible for the firm to make
some profits. If it were not the case, the firm will never be profitable and the
search for an optimal t becomes meaningless. Further, if P(t) is not too convex
then there are no local maxima and thus the maximum is unique. This, again, is
not restrictive, as P(t) will typically be concave over the domain of interest.
4 The impact of retention rate, discounts, revenues, and acquisition rates on CE
Our framework for the valuation of customer equity relies on several metrics commonly
used to characterize a customer database: retention rate, acquisition rate, customer
margins (revenues and costs), and discount rates. When any of these change, the
marketing action (t) must change to reach the new maximum customer equity. Since
we endogenized the marketing action, we can now answer the question: how do these
levers of customer value impact both the optimal marketing actions (t *) and customer
equity (CE* )? To answer this question, we perform a comparative static analysis on
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the CE problem. Furthermore, we make some generalization about how these levers
impact customer equity.
4.1 Change in retention rate (P(τ))
A change in the retention rate response function can come about in two different ways.
First, one might see an intercept or level shift that increases or decreases P(t) overall
without changing the sensitivity of P(t) to changes in t (i.e., the gradient @P tð Þ@t is
unaffected). Second, one might see a change in the sensitivity of P(t) to changes in t
(i.e., a change of @P tð Þ@t at t* while P(t*) is constant). One might, of course, observe a
combination of these two changes. In such a case, the total impact of the changes will
be the sum of the changes due to the level-shift and the sensitivity-shift. The combined
impact of both changes is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 3a An increase in retention sensitivity (
@P tð Þ
@t ) leads to an increase in t*.
A level-shift increase in retention (P(τ)) leads to an increase in Vce. It also leads to
an increase in t* when t* is small, and a decrease in t* when it is large. The cut-off
level is: t* : hS t*ð Þ > hD t*ð Þ
  FC
R t*ð Þ:S t*ð Þ þ 1:
Proof See Appendix B.2.
The retention probability affects the FOC through both hS and GM. Thus, when
looking at changes in P(t) we need to consider the combined impact of both changes.
In the case of a change in @P tð Þ@t , the situation is straightforward, as GM is unaffected
and thus the increase in @P tð Þ@t leads to an increase in the FOC through hS . Hence, the
firm would react by increasing its t. In other words, an increase in @P tð Þ@t means that the
firm has more to gain by waiting a little longer between communications, and since
the system was at equilibrium before, it now leans in favor of a larger t*.
In terms of database value, Vce is not directly affected by changes in
@P tð Þ
@t and
thus, strictly speaking, a change in @P tð Þ@t will not affect the database value. However,
a change in @P tð Þ@t cannot reasonably arise without some change in P(t). And thus, Vce
will be affected through the change in P(t). It is straightforward to show that a level-
shift increase in P(t) increases Vce. The envelope theorem tells us that although t* is
affected by changes in P, when looking at the net impact on Vce, we can ignore the
(small) impact of changes in P on t*, and simply look at the sign of @VCE@P . Here, we
have @VCE@P > 0 and thus Vce is increasing in P.
In the case of a level-shift, the situation is made complex in that GM always
increases when P(t) increases (which leads to a decrease in the FOC as ηD is
negative), but the effect on hS depends on
@P tð Þ
@t . If we assume that P(t) is inverted-
U shaped (increasing at a decreasing rate for small t— @VCE@P > 0;
@2P tð Þ
@t2 < 0; 8t < tp—
then decreasing after some threshold— @P tð Þ@t < 0; 8t < tp) then we find that for
small t an intercept-shift increase in P(t) leads to an increase in t*, and for large t
it leads to a decrease in t*. The difference in behavior comes from the fact that
when t is small, an increase in P(t) has a large impact on the database size and
spurs the company to seek an even larger database while, when t is large, an
increase in retention allows the firm to harvest the database to a greater extent.
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4.2 Change in expected profit per contact (R(t))
We study the impact of costs in the next section and focus here solely on A(t).
Similar to P(t), A(t) can be changed through an intercept-shift or through a change
in sensitivity to t. The situation is, however, a bit more complex for A(t) than for
P(t) because P(t) depends on A(t). In other words, defection depends in part on
the content that is sent to customers. Thus, we must account not only for the direct
effect of a change in A(t) on the FOC, but also for indirect effects through changes
in P(t).
Proposition 3b An increase in revenue per contact sensitivity (
@A tð Þ
@t ) leads to an
increase in t*. An intercept-shift in revenue per contact (A(t)) leads to an increase
in Vce. It also leads to a decrease in t* when t* is small to moderate, and an
increase in t* when it is large. A lower-bound to the cut-off level is: t*hS ¼ t2 þ 1:
Proof See Appendix B.3.
The impact of A (t) on Vce follows from the envelope theorem. In terms of the
impact of A(t) and @A tð Þ@t on t*, the proof in Appendix B.3 is longer than for the
previous proposition because of the effects of A on P. The essence of the
proposition is, however, straightforward. When the sensitivity of revenue to longer
t increases, there is a pressure towards longer t*. In case of a positive intercept-
shift, there is a tendency for the firm to take advantage of the shift by harvesting
the database.
4.3 Change in acquisition rate (g)
Proposition 3c An increase in acquisition rate leads to a decrease in t* and an
increase in Vce.
Proof The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3a. Since S is a linear function
of g, the elasticity hS does not depend on g. The only term in the FOC that depends
on the acquisition rate is the gross margin (through S). Thus all we are interested in





R tð Þ:S tð Þ  FC
R tð Þ:S tð Þ ¼
FC




Hence, @GM@g > 0 since
@S tð Þ
@g ¼ t1P tð Þ > 0. Thus, given that GM acts as a multiplier to
ηD, which is negative, an increase in acquisition rate—through increased acquisition
spending or increased acquisition effectiveness—will lead to a decrease in t* and
conversely for a decrease in acquisition rate. Finally, the increase in Vce follows from
the envelope theorem and the fact that @VCE@g is positive.
This relationship between g and t* is a direct result of treating customers as a
resource. When the resource is plentiful (g is high) the firm can harvest it; setting a low
t*. When the resource is scarce (g is low), the firm must conserve it; setting a high t*.
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4.4 Change in discount rate (r)
Proposition 3d An increase in discount rate leads to an increase in t* and a
decrease in Vce.
Proof Although counterintuitive with regards to t*, Proposition 3d is straightforward to
prove. To show that t*increases in r, we first note that ηR, hS , and GM are independent










ert  1  1
 
> 08r > 0; t > 0:
The derivative of ηD with respect to r is positive for all positive r and t.
2 This
implies that the optimal reaction for a firm faced with an increase in discount rate is
to increase its inter-communication interval. This may seem counter-intuitive at first,
as one might believe that increasing r makes future revenues less attractive and, thus,
one might want to decrease t so as to realize more profits in the short-term.
What actually happens is that an increase in r leads to a decrease in the discount
multiplier (D). This decrease means that, holding everything else constant, the value
of each name decreases, and so does the value of the database. This decrease must be
offset by either an increase in database size (S) or an increase in expected profit per
name per communication (R). Both are accomplished by increasing t.
It is straightforward to show that as r increases, the value of the database
decreases. Applying the envelope theorem one more time we have:
@Vce
@r
¼ RS  FC  @
@r
ert
ert  1 ¼ RS  FC
  tert
ert  1ð Þ2 < 0:
Hence, an increase in r leads to both an increase in optimal inter-communication
time (t*) and a decrease in database value (Vce). The impact of r on t* could be used
to study how a firm should vary its communication time in response to interest rate
variations. However, a more interesting study is how t* changes as a firm grows
from a start-up to a large legitimate company. Indeed, a start-up is a risky venture
and its implicit discount rate will be high. As the firm grows, its future becomes less
uncertain and its discount rate diminishes. Proposition 3d states that in such case, the
firm will decrease its inter-communication time as it grows. This decrease in t
effectively shifts the firm from a “database growth” regime to a “profit generation”
regime as it now tries to extract more revenues from its database and leaves itself
less time between communication to replace the names lost.
4.5 Changes in costs
The firm’s reaction to any increase in cost, whether fixed or variable, is to increase
optimal inter-communication interval. The intuition for this is straightforward. An
2 To see this, note that at t=0, rtert ¼ ert  1 ¼ 0, and for all τ>0,t > 0; @@t rtert ¼ rertþr2tert > @@t ert  1 ¼ rert :
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increase in cost reduces per-campaign profits. The firm must then increase t* to try
to boost its profits per campaign—reducing the number of communications sent
raises expected revenue per campaign.
Proposition 3e An increase in fixed or variable costs leads to a decrease in Vce and
an increase in t*.








The study of the levers of customer value reveals some consistent patterns. The firm
has two conflicting objectives that it is trying to balance: database growth and
database harvesting. Database growth involves a long-term approach, so the
marketer needs to adjust marketing actions so as to increase the database size, (S).
In the CE framework this can be achieved by reducing the communication frequency
(i.e., increasing t). On the other hand, when the objective is to harvest the database,
marketing actions need to be adjusted so as to increase short-term revenues. This can
be achieved by reducing the inter-communication interval (i.e., decreasing t —
except in some occasions when t is very small, in which case both objectives are
achieved by increasing t).
Whenever there is a change in the firm’s performance or in the environment that
is beneficial to the firm (e.g., higher return from acquisition, better retention rate,
lower interest rate), the firm can adjust its actions in a way that favors harvesting at
the expense of growth (i.e., decrease t). Conversely, if the change is detrimental
(e.g., lower return per campaign, higher costs), the firm must counteract this change
by leaning more toward growth rather than harvesting (i.e., increase t).
5 Acquisition policy
Now that we have discussed the key levers of the database value and can maximize
the marketing actions (t*) for any given acquisition policy, we can turn to the
problem of optimizing acquisition. Indeed, we have thus far assumed that acquisition
expenditures were fixed. We were able to do this since Lemma 2 shows that the
actual spending on name acquisition is separable from the optimization of t, and
therefore only the acquisition rate matters for the derivation of the optimal inter-
communication interval. The implication of this result is that the marketer first needs
to derive the optimal t for a given acquisition rate (Section 3.1), and then optimize
acquisition spending given the solution for t*. Section 4 ignored acquisition except
for to show that an increase in g leads to a decrease in t* (Proposition 3c).
5.1 Optimal acquisition policy
Our goal for this section is to derive the optimal acquisition policy (g* ) as a function
of the optimal marketing policy t*. We found in Section 4.3 that a higher customer
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acquisition rate leads to greater database size, and larger revenues, but these benefits
must be offset against the cost of acquiring these customers. It is critical, for this
analysis, to understand that the acquisition costs correspond to a stream of payment
over time, rather than a one-time transaction.
Formally, since, by Proposition 2, we can separate the optimization of the optimal
inter-communication interval (t) from the optimal acquisition rate, then t* can be
expressed as a function of acquisition spending. Thus we can find the optimal
expenditure on acquisition by taking the derivative of CE with respect to g. The
optimum is found when marginal revenues are equal to marginal costs. We formalize
this in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If the periodicity at which the acquisition expenditures are recognized
is equal to the periodicity of the communications, then the optimal acquisition rate
occurs when the marginal acquisition cost per name is equal to the CLVof the name.
Proof See Appendix C.
The idea behind the proof is straightforward. Let us assume that the firm currently
acquires g customers per period for a cost of AQ(g) and is considering acquiring one
more. This will cost of $AQ ¼ AQ g þ 1ð Þ  AQðgÞ. This is worth doing if the net
present value (NVP) of the additional expenses is lower than the NPVof the additional
revenues. In each period, the cost of acquiring the extra customer is ∆AQ and the NPV
of the future revenues derived from the acquired customer is its CLV. Thus, one will
acquire customers as long as their acquisition costs are lower than their CLV.
It may seem odd that our analysis shows on the one hand that maximizing CLV is
sub-optimal for the firm, and on the other hand that CLV is the appropriate to set
customer acquisition policies. There seems to be a disconnect here as if we set t*
according to our Customer Equity framework, the CLV of each of the customers in
our database is by definition smaller than if we set t* so as to maximize the CLV.
Thus, since we have just shown that acquisition is set based on the CLVof the people
we acquire, we could spend more on acquisition, and thus acquire more customers, if
we set t* according to the CLV rather than the CE. It stands to reason that if
maximizing CLV leads to customers that are worth more than maximizing CE, and
that maximizing CLV allows the firm to acquire more such customers, than
maximizing should be more profitable than maximizing CE. Why is it not the case?
To understand why, let us analyze a synthetic case where we set communication and
acquisition policies according to both CE and CLV and see how the firm’s decision
and its profits change depending on whether it maximizes CLV or CE.
To specify the various parameters of our synthetic case, let us assume that there
are no fixed costs of communications (FC=0). This insures that any differences we
find are due to the revenue and acquisition stream and not due to an allocation of
fixed costs over a smaller or larger pool of customers. Further, let us use quadratic
acquisition costs (AQ(g) = g2), revenues per communication that follow an
exponential recovery process (R tð Þ ¼ r0 1 eritð Þ, where r0=5 and r1=10), and a
retention rate that follows a log-logistic function (P tð Þ ¼ al ltð Þa1
.
1þ ltð Það Þ2,
where α=2 and l=3/4). These functional forms are arbitrary, they are chosen as
simple widely used expressions that conform to the assumptions made in Section 2.
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Finally, let us assume that the firm is a start-up and thus use a relatively high
discount rate of 20% per annum (Haenlein et al. 2006).
Using these equations and the solver function in excel, it is straightforward to find
the t that maximizes the CE (t*CE) and compare it to the t that maximizes the CLV
(t*CLV ). We can then compute the CE that would be generated if one used t
*
CLV rather
than t*CE: This static comparison will help us better understand the ramification of
maximizing CLV rather than CE.
The results of the maximization with regards to CE and CLV are shown in
Table 1. As one can see, maximizing CE leads to an inter-communication interval
that is 13% larger than if one were to maximize the CLV. This leads to a slightly
larger retention rate and larger revenue per communication per customer, but as
expected a lower CLV (1% smaller). And thus smaller acquisition budgets (-2%) and
fewer new customers acquired every year (-1%). However, because the retention rate
is larger and fewer communications are sent with the larger t when maximizing CE,
this approach results in a larger pool of customers at any point in time (+13%). This
leads to a higher value of the firm (+2%) despite the fewer opportunities to generate
revenues (-12% contacts per year).
This shows the problem with maximizing CLV as a business practice. CLV favors
generating profits now at the expense of future profits. This is rational as future
profits are worth less than current ones. However, this comes at the expense of lower
retention rates. This is factored in the CLV framework on a cohort by cohort basis.
However, what the CLV framework does not take into account is that lower retention
rates don’t just mean that the firm will extract less revenue from newly acquired
customers in the future, they also mean that the firm currently has fewer of its past
customers to extract revenue from in the present.
To better understand how CLV the impact of past cohorts on present revenues,
consider Fig 1a, b. Figure 1a represents the evolution of one cohort. Figure 1b
represents the make up of the database as new cohorts are acquired and old ones
shrink. Focusing on the tenth year (Y10), one can see that at any point in time, the
database contains the names acquired as part of the latest cohort, plus the names
Table 1 Static comparison of CE and CLV maximizing strategies
CE CLV Diff % Diff
Optimal communication interval (t*) 0.802 0.708 0.094 13.33%
Retention rate (P) 0.487 0.485 0.002 0.39%
Revenue per communication per customer 4.998 4.996 0.003 0.05%
Non-discounted lifetime revenues 9.734 9.694 0.041 0.42%
Customer lifetime value (CLV) 8.623 8.703 -0.080 -0.92%
Number of customers acquired per year (g) 4.311 4.351 -0.040 -0.92%
Yearly acquisition spending (AQ) 18.589 18.935 -0.347 -1.83%
Steady state customer base (S) 6.734 5.975 0.759 12.70%
Profit per communication 33.657 29.848 3.808 12.76%
# of communications per year 1.247 1.413 -0.166 -11.76%
Value of the firm (CE) 135.898 132.989 2.909 2.19%
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from the previous cohort that survived one period, plus the names of the cohort before
that survived two periods, and so on. Hence, by collating at any one time the individuals
retain across cohorts we can recreate the profile of any single cohort across time. Thus,
the revenues generated by the database in each period are equal to the undiscounted
revenues generated by one cohort over its entire lifetime. To maximize profits for a
given acquisition policy, the firm should maximize the undiscounted cash flow
generated from an individual rather than the discount cash flow (i.e., the CLV).
Referring back to Table 1, we can see that although the t*CLV produces a higher CLV
than t*CE, it does produce a lower non-discounted lifetime revenues (by 0.42%) which,
coupled with a smaller steady state customer base, yields a lower value for the firm.
A side benefit of the fact that at any point in time the profile of the customer base
is equivalent to the profile of a cohort over its lifetime is that it allows us to relax the
assumptions of constant retention rate and revenues. Indeed, looking at Fig. 2a we
see a cohort profile where retention is not constant over the life of its members.
Retention is low in the first year, high for the next 4 years, then steady for the
remaining years. This uneven retention violates our assumption of constant
retention rate which is necessary to simplify the infinite sum of future revenues
into the simple Equation that is (9). However, as is demonstrated by Figure 2b,
the database size in this case is still equal to the sum of the cohort size over its life,
and the revenues generated by the database in one period are still equal to the
revenues generated by a cohort over its life. Thus, Lemma 1 will still hold in that
there is a fixed long-term size to the database (the actual size will not be tg1P tð Þ as P
is not constant over time, but it can still be calculated, we show an example of this
in Section 6.1). Further, one can still use the first order condition developed in (12)
to maximize the database value. Finally, proposition 4 still applies, and we can
compute the maximum acquisition spending by computing the CLV of each cohort.
5.2 The path to steady state
Skeptics might argue that our Customer Equity framework might work well for an
established company that already has a customer base and does indeed derive
revenues from both its new and old customers. But, what of a start-up company? It
does not have ‘old’ customers. Wouldn’t a CLV maximization approach allow it to
spend more on customer acquisition and thus grow faster?
To show this is not the case and that the CE maximization approach primes over a
CLV approach even away from steady state, we use the synthetic example developed
in the preceding section and plot the growth in database size and revenues over time
for our hypothetical firm assuming it starts with no customer at time 0. As one can
see in Fig. 3, the CE approach grows the customer base faster and to a higher level
than the CLV approach. Revenues follow a similar pattern.
As a bonus, the start-up firm will need to invest less in customer acquisition to
reach the faster growth. Thus, it will need to raise less capital and provide a larger
ROI than if it were to follow a CLV maximization strategy. These two benefits
should make raising capital easier.









































Fig. 1 a Cohort Size Over Time b Database Size Over Time (by cohorts)
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6 Heterogeneity
An important assumption was made about customers being identical in terms of key
constituents of the CE: the revenue function, the retention function, and acquisition





































Fig. 2 a Cohort Size- Uneven Attrition b Database Size- Uneven Attrition
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“average” consumer. This simplified view the derivation of many of the results, but
we need to understand how robust the results are if we relax this assumption.
First note that marketers deal with two types of heterogeneity: observed and
unobserved. This leads to two questions. First, what happens when customers are treated
as identical when they are not (unobserved heterogeneity)? Second, how does our frame-
work change, and is it still applicable, when heterogeneity is observed and the marketer
treats different customers differently by sending different communications to different
groups of customers, or send communications at different rates to different customers?
6.1 Unobserved heterogeneity
Customers can be heterogeneous in their retention probability (P) and/or their expected
return from each communication (R). If consumers have identical retention
probabilities, but are heterogeneous in their expected return, then, if all customers
are treated as being identical, the average expected return (R) can be used to maximize
profits. Indeed, let f(R) be the probability density function of R. The expected database
value is obtained by integrating out customer equity across customers:
E½Vce ¼
Z
RS  FC  ert
ert  1 f ðRÞdR ¼ RS  FC
  ert
ert  1 :
Taking the same approach is a little more complicated for heterogeneity in the
retention rate. Indeed, P appears on the denominator of CE through S. Thus, going
back to Little’s Law, we need to compute:















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
S(CE) Rev(CE) S(CLV) Rev(CLV)
Fig. 3 Customer base size and revenues
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The difference stems from the fact that customers with higher retention rates stay
in the database longer than customers with lower retention rates. For instance, if we
assume that the acquisition efforts yield a stream of customers whose retention rate





1 P dP ¼ tg
Z 1
0
Γ aþ bð Þ
ΓðaÞΓ bð Þ p
a1 1 Pð Þb2dP:
Since Γ nþ 1ð Þ ¼ nΓðnÞ, we have:
S ¼ tg aþ b  1ð Þ
b  1ð Þ
Z 1
0
Γ aþ b  1ð Þ
Γ að ÞΓ b  1ð Þ p
a1 1 Pð Þb2dP ¼ t:g
1 aaþb1ð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼1
where we recognize the term aaþb1 as the expected value of a B(a,β-1). Hence, if
the heterogeneity in retention rate in the acquisition stream is characterized by a B(a,
β), then the marketer should optimize its database using the expected value of a B
(a,β-1) as its average P.
6.2 Observed heterogeneity
A firm faced with observed heterogeneity can adapt its marketing actions in two
ways. The traditional method used by marketers is to segment customers into
mutually exclusive segments based on their purchase behavior and then treat each
customer segment as homogenous. Airlines, with their tiered frequent flyer
programs, are classic examples of this approach. Proponents of Customer
Relationship Management (CRM) propose a more radical approach where each
customer is able to receive an individually tailored marketing communication.
It is easy to see that the CE framework is appropriate for the traditional customer
segmentation approach. One can optimize each segment’s marketing communica-
tions and overall value separately, as a function of each segment’s acquisition,
margins, and retention rates. One can also easily compute the benefits of having
more or less segments by comparing the segment values in an N segment world to
those in an N+1 segment world. The trade-off one makes when increasing the
number of segments is that revenues should increase with the number of segments as
one can better customize the marketing communications when the segments become
more homogenous; but, communication costs will also increase as different
communication must be created for different segments. This naturally leads to an
optimal number of segments.
The promises of CRM are to make the customization costs so low that it now
becomes feasible to have segments of size one. If this promise were realized, one
could argue that a CLV model is more appropriate than a CE model. Indeed, if
segments are of size one then they truly are depletable. When the segment
member defects; the segment is depleted. Newly acquired customers constitute
3 β>1 is needed to ensure that f(1)=0. If f(1)>0 then some people will stay in the system forever,
regardless of the firm’s actions. This would lead to degenerate solutions.
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their own segments rather than replenishing pre-existing segments. If all decision
variables (acquisition spending, communication frequency, communication con-
tent, etc.) are optimized at the individual level independent of other individuals,
then the CLV approach might be the correct one. However, that is not what CRM
actually entails.
What CRM proposes to do in practice is to develop a set of rules or models that,
when applied to the information known about the firm’s customer, yield a customized
marketing message (Winer 2001). The nature and the amount of customization varies
across applications. For instance, American Airlines uses CRM to select which
WebFares to advertise to each of its frequent flyers in its weekly emails. Citibank uses
CRM to direct callers to its toll free lines to the sales person that is most adept at
selling the type of products that their predictive model selected as a likely candidate
for cross-selling. Amazon.com uses CRM to try to up-sell its customers by offering
them bundles of books they might be interested in. In each of these examples, different
customers will experience different offerings. Different frequent flyers will be alerted
of different promotional fares depending on the cities they fly most; different readers
will be offered different book bundles depending on the books they are searching for.
Nevertheless, the set of rules or models that are used to generate these offers will be
identical for all frequent flyers, or all Amazon customers. The output will be different,
but the process will be identical. Further, the costs of creating the rules and
communication templates will be shared across all individuals rather than borne
individually. As such, the CE framework developed here still applies. The CRM
objectives will be to develop the set of rules that maximize overall CE rather than any
specific individual’s CLV. When doing so, it is critical to use the appropriate objective
function. This will be achieved by considering the impact of the CRM efforts on
retention and amounts spent and maximize the long term database value just as has
been done in this paper with the inter-communication interval (t).
7 Managerial implications and conclusion
The lifetime value of a firm’s customer base depends both on the acquisition process
used by the firm and the marketing actions targeted at these customers. To take both
aspects into account, we draw on the theory of optimal resource management to revisit
the concept of customer lifetime value. Our contention is that customers are a
renewable resource and hence marketing actions directed at acquiring and extracting
revenues from customers should take a long-term value-maximization approach. Thus
we study the implications of moving from Customer Lifetime Value maximization to
Customer Equity maximization. In answer to the first questions raised in the
introduction (Does CLV maximization equate to CE maximization?), our findings
indicate that disregarding future acquisition leads to sub-optimal revenue extraction
strategies (Proposition 1). This will then lead to sub-optimal acquisition strategies as
acquisition spending are set according to revenues (Proposition 4).
Following on from this, our second research question addresses what is the proper
benchmark to use to guide customer acquisition policy. We find that the firm is able
to generate more profits by spending less on acquiring a new customer if it were to
use the CE approach, than if it were to use a CLV approach.
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To answer the final research questions raised (What is the appropriate metric, how
is it computed and maximized?), we first need to consider how the database value is
impacted by actions of the marketer. As we summarized in Proposition 2, our model
of customer equity directly accounts for the impact of marketing actions on the value
of a firm’s customer assets. This allows us to derive the optimal actions for the firm,
and we derive the long-term steady-state size of a firm’s customer base (Lemma 1).
Our first-order condition for the maximization of customer equity (Proposition 2)
shows that a firm should adapt its marketing actions to changes in the critical factors
that impact database value. The strength of the first-order condition derived in
Proposition 2 is that it is easy to optimize empirically. The firm can run a series of
tests to estimate the various elasticities and infer from them if it should increase or
decrease its communication periodicity. This is simplified by the fact that customer
equity has a unique maximum. The first-order condition also lends itself well to
static comparisons (Propositions 3a to 3d). This exercise shows how firms are
attempting to balance two conflicting objectives: database growth and database
harvesting. Whenever there is a change in the firm’s performance or in the
environment that is beneficial to the firm (e.g., higher return from acquisition, better
retention rate, lower interest rate), the firm should adjust its actions in a way that
favors harvesting at the expense of growth. Conversely, if the change is detrimental
(e.g., lower return per campaign, higher costs), the firm must counteract this change
by leaning more toward growth rather than harvesting.
We finish the paper with a discussion of customer heterogeneity. We show that
our model is robust to unobserved heterogeneity. The learning point there is that
ignoring heterogeneity in customers’ valuation of the communication is less of an
issue than ignoring customer heterogeneity in retention rate.
We recognize several limitations inherent in this study. We made specific
assumptions regarding the relationship between customer retention and the firm’s
communication strategy, both in terms of timing (through t) and in content (through
the relationship between A and P) that could be relaxed in future work. Further work
also needs to be done to incorporate the impact of competitive actions and reactions
on the measurement of customer equity. This might potentially be done by folding
our approach with a theoretical model such as the one developed by Fruchter and
Zhang (2004). We believe, however, that the framework presented in this study is a
useful starting point for such a competitive analysis.
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Appendix A: proof of lemma 1 and proposition 1
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let P(t) be the proportion of the database that is retained from one campaign to the
next, given that t is the fixed inter-campaign time interval. Let the acquisition stream
be g(t)=t.g. If the firm begins with a database size at S0 6¼ S, we show that the long-
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term stationary value of the database is still S. To find this value, solve the Law of
Motion for the size of the database as:
S ¼ S:P tð Þ þ t:g ¼ t:g
1 P tð Þ :
What if the database size is not at the stationary value? Then, if t is constant, the
state variable converges to the stationary value. To see this, pick any arbitrary value
for the starting size of the database e.g. pick any " 6¼ 0 such that Si < S or Si > S e.g.:
Si ¼ t:g1 P tð Þ þ ":
so that for the next period:
Siþ1 ¼ SiP tð Þ þ t:g ¼ t:g1 P tð Þ þ "
 
P tð Þ þ t:g ¼ t:g
1 P tð Þ þ ":P tð Þ
and for any n>0,
Siþn ¼ t:g1 P t; kð Þ þ "P tð Þ
n
and lim
n!1 Siþn ¼ S, since P tð Þ 2 0; 1ð Þ and therefore "P tð Þ
n ! 0 as n!1:
A.2 maximization of customer value versus customer equity
Assume that we look at the equilibrium conditions so that Si ¼ S. The value of an




eirtP tð Þi R tð Þ  FC
S
 




ert  P tð Þ :




eirt P tð ÞS  FC  ¼ R tð ÞS  FC  ert
ert  1:
Hence, we have the database value as a function of the customer value:
Vce ¼ VclvS e
rt  P tð Þ
ert  1 :
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The fourth term ð @@t S e
rtP tð Þ
ert1 Þ will be equal to 0 iff: hS þ hertP tð Þ
ert1
, or hS ¼ hertP tð Þ
ert1
:
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ert  P tð Þ
ert  1 ¼
rert  @P tð Þ@t
ert  1 
ert  P tð Þð Þrert
ert  1ð Þ2
¼ 1
ert  1 re
rt  @P tð Þ
@t
 e







ert  1 re
rt  @P tð Þ
@t
 e






¼  trert 1 P tð Þ
ert  1ð Þ ert  P tð Þð Þ
 
þ @P tð Þ
@t
t
ert  P tð Þ
 
:
This means that ηS and hertP tð Þ
ert1
are both affine transformations of @P tð Þ@t , and thus
will be equal for all @P tð Þ@t iff both their intercepts and their slopes are equal, or:
1 ¼ trert 1 P tð Þ




1 P tð Þ ¼
t
ert  P tð Þ :
The second condition gives us that they will be equal only when t=0. Applying
l’Hospital Rule to the first condition we find that, at the limit for t → 0, the first




ert1 . And thus, maximizing the Vclv and the Vce lead to the same optimal only
when t*=0, which cannot happen since at t=0 the database value is negative
( Vceð0Þ ¼ 1ð Þ). QED
Appendix B: maximum derivation
We handle the maximization of the database value in three steps. First, we derive the
first-order condition that needs to be satisfied for a t to be optimal. Second we show
that such a t exists. And third, we provide conditions under which the maximum is
known to be unique.
B.1 First-order condition
To derive the first-order condition related to the maximization of customer equity
with respect to the inter-communication time, we seek the point at which the
derivative of (B-1) with respect to t is null. We do so in the following steps:
CE tð Þ ¼ R tð Þ:S tð Þ  FC  ert
ert  1  AQ
er
er  1 : ðB 1Þ
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þ Ω tð Þ  FCð Þ re
rt
ert  1 
re2rt







þ r Ω tð Þ  FCð Þ 1 e
rt


















R tð Þ:S tð Þ
t
hR þ hs þ hD
R tð Þ:S tð Þ  FC
R tð Þ:S tð Þ
 
: ðB 2Þ
If we restrict ourselves to cases where the optimal database value is positive
(otherwise the firm would not engage in database driven marketing) then we have R
(t)>0 and R tð ÞS tð Þ  FC > 0 and thus, at the maximum, the following first-order
condition needs to be satisfied:
hR þ hS þ hDGM ¼ 0 ðB 3Þ
Where GM ¼ R tð Þ:S tð ÞFC
R tð Þ:S tð Þ is the gross margin generated by each communication.
The technical appendix contains the proof of the existence and uniqueness of the
maximum.
B.2 change in retention probabilities
i. Change in @P tð Þ=@t
The retention sensitivity (@P tð Þ=@t) only affects the FOC through hS . An







1þ @P tð Þ
@P tð Þ
t
1 P tð Þ
 
¼ t
1 P tð Þ > 0:
This increase in hS will lead the firm to increase its t to reach maximum profits.
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ii. Intercept-shift in P(t)
We look here at the change in FOC resulting from an intercept-shift increase in
retention probabilities. That is:
P1 tð Þ ¼ P tð Þ þ P0@P1 tð Þ
@t
¼ @P tð Þ
@t
:









1þ @P1 tð Þ
@P tð Þ
t
1 P1 tð Þ
 





1 P tð Þ  P0
 
¼ t





@p0 has the same sign as @P tð Þ=@t. For small t, where @P tð Þ=@t is
positive, the intercept-shift will have a positive impact on hS . For large t, where
@P tð Þ=@t is negative, the impact will be negative.





R tð Þ:S tð Þ  FC




R tð Þ:S tð Þ¼
FC











1 P tð Þ  P0¼
t:g
1 P tð Þ  P0ð Þ2
> 0: ðB 6Þ
Hence, an intercept-shift increase in P(t) leads to an increase in GM that leads to
a decrease in FOC. Putting (B-4), (B-5), and (B-6) back into the FOC, we have that
an intercept-shift increase in P(t) will lead to higher t* if:
t





1 P tð Þ  Poð Þ2
FC











1 P > hDj j
FC
R tð Þ:S tð ÞhS > hDj j
FC
R tð Þ:S tð Þ þ 1:
ðB 7Þ
That is, if we assume that P(t) is inverted-U shape, t* increases for small t* when
there is an intercept-shift in P(t), and decreases for large t*.
B.3 change in revenue per contact
i. Change in @A tð Þ=@t
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The revenue sensitivity affects the FOC through both ηR and ηS. We have:
@hR







A tð Þ  VC¼
t
A tð Þ  VC > 0:
and
@hS
@ @A tð Þ@t
¼ @
@ A tð Þ@t
1þ @P tð Þ
@t
t
1 P tð Þ
 
¼ @
@ A tð Þ@t
1þ t








@ A tð Þ@t
1þ t









@ A tð Þ@t
1þ t














Hence, the database sensitivity to t increases when the sensitivity of the revenue
increases, creating a compounding effect that leads the firm to increase its optimal
sending rate (t*).
iii. Intercept-shift in A(t)
An intercept-shift in A(t) will be felt through ηR, ηR, and GM. Thus, we compute
the following:
A1 tð Þ ¼ A tð Þ þ a0
@A1 tð Þ
@t









A tð Þ  VC
¼ @A tð Þ
@t
t
A tð Þ  VCð Þ2 ¼
hR











































1 P tð Þð Þ2¼
S



















:S tð Þ þ R tð Þ: @S tð Þ@a0






S tð Þ þ R tð Þ:S tð Þ1P tð Þ 1t @f ðxÞ@x













1þ @P tð Þ
@t
t
1 P tð Þ
 
¼ t
1 P tð Þ
@ @P tð Þ@t
@a0























t 1 P tð Þð Þ2
@f ðxÞ
@x






@a0 is negative for small to moderate levels of t* (i.e.,
t* : 1 P t*ð Þ > @P t*ð Þ=@t) and positive for larger t*. Thus, for small to
moderate t*, the negative impacts on ηR, hS and the positive impact on GM will both
yield a smaller t*. For large t*, the net impact might be positive. The point at which
the effect reverses itself is given by:
t :
hR
R tð Þ þ
1
t 1 P tð Þ2

  @P tð Þ
@t






R tð Þ:S tð Þ
 1
R tð Þ þ
1











¼ t 1 P tð Þð Þ
or t* : hS ¼ t2 þ 1:
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Appendix C. optimal acquisition policy
Let us assume that the firm currently acquires g customers per period for a cost of
AQ(g) and is considering acquiring one more. This will cost of $AQ ¼ AQ g þ 1ð Þ
AQðgÞ. Between communications it will acquire tg customer at a cost of tΔAQ.
This is worth doing if the net present value (NVP) of the additional expenses is lower




Ignoring any impact of g on t*, the increase in revenue comes from the increase
in database size: $g ¼ 1) $S ¼ t1P. However, we do not go from SðgÞ to
S g þ 1ð Þ in one period, it only builds over time. The change in database size can be
written as Si ¼ t
Pi
j¼0
pi, with $S1 ¼ ΔS.
The change in database size affects only the revenues, it does not affect the fixed

















¼ 1þ 1þ Pð Þ
ert
þ 1þ P þ P
2ð Þ
e2rt
1þ P þ P2 þ P3ð Þ
e3rt







































þ . . .
 
þ . . .




e3rt þ    ¼ e
rt
ertP, then we can





























ert  1 > tΔAQ
ert
ert  1 , R
ert
ert  P > ΔAQ , CLV > ΔAQ
In other words, the optimal acquisition policy from a profit perspective is to spend
up to the CLV on acquisition.
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